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PREFACE
There are a number of theories concerning the creation
and the maintenance of international coalitions. Some of
them are extremely vague, few are fully worked out, and some
of them contradict one another. It is hoped that this work
will aid in the clarification of "why" many international or-
ganizations fail to achieve a strong degree of cohesion. As
is pointed out in the paper, several of the elements necessary
for the maintenance of cohesion in international groupings
come into direct conflict with the major goals and aspirations
of international alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization, and its futile effort to establish a multilateral nu-
clear force, is a prime example of this continuing "quest for
cohesion." Intra-alliance politics are permeated with this
struggle for harmony and cooperation.
My special thanks are due to all individuals with whom
I communicated concerning this paper. Special thanks are in
order to Dr. Faye Carroll, director of my graduate committee,
and to Dr. Georg Bluhm and Dr. Thomas Madron whose collabor-






PREFACE . • . . • • . iii
Chapter
I. TiE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK









III. CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES . . • . 19
IV. NATO AND NUCLEAR SHARING: THE MLF . . 33
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . • . 51
A2PENDIX "A" • • . . . • • 56







The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (a military alli-
ance) is a major component in the contemporary international
scene. Relations among the various entities in this scene are
characterized by three features that give the international
milieu its distinctive and unique nature.
First, the international milieu consists of several di-
vergent parts. In other words, it is fragmented: a changing
whole made up of a variety of actors. In such a system, each
individual part places its highest allegiance upon itsrlf, or
at least considers that the achievement cf any higher aim is
inseparable from the preservation of its main interest and
values. As a result, international politics remain in a sus-
pended state of competition.1
The second facet that must be remembered by the student
of international relations is that such groupings differ in
many ways: in resources, in governmental structure, in in-
ternal solidarity and external awareness, in economic stabil-
ity, philosophical outlook, in historical background, and in
geographical location. Such differences contribute to a fun-
damental uncertainty within this state of competition.
1Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting
of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,





The third characteristic is the absence of any temporal
power capable of effectively controlling these competing units.
This condition encourages the settlement of differences through
forceful and/or violent moans. Stanley Hoffmann stated this
premise when he wrote:
The absence of any temporal power above these competingunits leaves them free to resort to force in order toattain objectives which the very intensity of the contest(and the determination of most contestants to frustrateambitions incompatible with their own) makes inaccessibleby peaceful means alone. To sum up: world politics . . .is marked by a prevalence of conflict over cooperation(bearing in mind that many forms of international coopera-tion are themselves responses to conflict, and that eventhese suffer the continuation of conflict within them).2
"An international system is the ensemble constituted by
political units that maintain regular relations with each oth-
er and that are all capable of being implicated in a general-
ized war."
3
NATO fits the criteria of this basic definition.
This paper proposes to undertake a comprehensive investi-
gation into the role, attitudes, and interrelationships of West
Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States within
the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This
investigation will be limited to the involvement of these four
member states in the proposed establishment, and eventual fail-
ure of a NATO controlled multilateral nuclear force (RLF).
This limitation was imposed because it was discerned that these
four major NATO members set the tempo and boundaries for the
2 •
d.
3Richard Howard and Annette B. Fox, Peace and War: ATheory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday Press,1956), p. 94.
3
debate stemming from this. proposal. The smaller member states
seemed reluctant to take a definite stance on the issue until
one of these four set forth its own convictions. Once this
was done the smaller countries allied themselves with a major
member's view. Thus, a study of the relationships and positions
of France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States will
lend itself to a full and precise investigation of the matter.
The time span involved in the major portion of this research
will be limited to the years 1960 through 1965, as these were
the years in which the MLF proposal had its origin, was debated,
and died from a lack of action.
The proposal for the MLF issued from many years of dis-
cussion within the framework of NATO concerning two principal
factors: (1) the security of the United States' European al-
lies in the face of changing military technology, and (2) the
political requirements of maintaining alliance cohesion against
centrifugal forces that beset all military coalitions.
4
The
central technological fact that had to be considered was the
development of modern long-range missile weaponry systems, and
counter systems, of the East and the West (the Soviet Union and
the United States) until a semblance of parity was achieved.
The political facet that was paramount among the United States'
European allies was the credibility of American claims of pro-
tection once such nuclear parity became a reality. Would the
United States under all circumstances risk its own cities and
4Thomas C. Wiegele, "The Origins of the MLF Concept, 1957-
1960," Orbis, XII, (Summer, 19(8), 465-466.
4
populations in order to defend Europe against all aggressive
acts by her Eastern neighbors? There also existed a degree of
apprehension among NATO members concerning the question of nu-
clear control within the Atlantic Alliance, for example the
double veto, single or mono-veto or uniimity.
5
It is in this
environment of uncertainty of relationships that the multi-
lateral concept will be investigated.
Aside from poor coordination or planning, one reason that
international alliances may fail to function effectively is
because they lack political cohesiveness. That is to say
that such alliances may be ineffective because the,/ are riven
by internal quarrels, technological and political disagree-
ments, and misunderstandings.
Any military coalition will be more effective and its
claims more credible to the extent that its members agree on
the major objectives; that they clearly and precisely define
such objectives; that they aid one another diplomatically;
and that they developla trust that once the casus foederis a-
rises, the partners will in fact meet their stated obligations.
Two hypothetical situations, general in structure, and
several precise arguments are utilized in the research of
'These terms refer to the manner of control to be used in
the event that the firing of nuclear weapons became a reality.
The double veto implies a situation where the United States
and the host country both must give permission for the firing.
The single veto system (unanimity) simply means that any one
member of an alliance has the power to stop the use of nuclear
weapons assigned to the alliance.
6K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A framework for 




materials within the framework of this theory. The first hy-
pothetical situation to 1)c investigated is concerned with tho
fact that the effectiveness of an international military coali-
tion is weakened or nullified by a lack of cohesiveness,
riven by internal quarrels, among its member states. There
was no consensus (a _. ignificant amount of agreement measured
through actions, votes, etc.) among France, Germany, Great
Britain, and the United States concerning the degree of empha-
sis to be placed upon the multilateral concept as a policy of
nuclear deterrence. (An intervening variable here that is
capable of being measured is the various views held by these
four members in reference to the aggressive tendencies of their
maj,)r military foe, the Soviet Union.) The objectives to be
achieved by the MLF were not clearly and precisely defined
(each member visualized this nuclear force in reference to his
own country's conviction). There was never an exact definition
of the structural organization to be utilized for the proposed
multilateral nuclear force. That is to say that the various
administrative levels, such as the proper chain of command, the
veto powers of each participant, and various other admanistra-
tive decisions were never precisely nor even clearly defined
to the potential participants.
The second hypothetical situation concerns itself with
the problem of national sovereignty within the alliance. As
sovereign states (to retain a major controlling decision in in-
ternational dealings concerning major policy criteria) the mem-
bers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were not ready
6
nor willing to delegate major decisions of policy, especially
decisions pertaining to peace and war, to each other, nor to
any single central system such as the multilateral nuclear
force (MLF). There was no effective nuclear deterrent value
in the proposal for a MLF because the credibility of such a
force was weakeiled by the various levels and types of veto to
be exercised by each participating member state. (This pro-
posal differed extensively from the previous American "massive
retaliation" policy, "a nuclear umbrella"). There was a lack
of trust that once the casus foederis arose, the partners
would in fact meet their commitments. (There has been a long-
standing lack of complete trust among these four major members





As was previously indicated, the proposal for the estab-
lishment of a multilateral nuclear force issued from several
years of discussion within the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion concerning two basic points: (1) the security of the
United States' European allies in the face of changing military
technology and, (2) the political requirements of maintaining
alliance cohesion against centrifugal forces that beset all
military coalitions.
7
The launching of the Soviet Union's artificial sa2llite,
Sputnik I in October, 1957, emphasized to the United States
and to its European allies the fact that the Soviet Union had
now gained the capability to initiate and perhaps execute suc-
cessfully an intercontinental launching of an atomic warhead.
In December of that year, the NATO heads of government author-
ized the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (SHAPE) to conduct
a study of long-range missile capabilities within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Out of these studies grew sug-
gestions for a force of mobile medium-range missiles in Western
Europe to be operated by a mixed-manned allied team.
7Wiegele, "The Origins of the MLF Concept, 1957-1960,"
Pp. 465-66.
8
Many such proposals pertaining to the problem of nuclear
sharing were considered on both sides of the Atlantic during
the years 1958 through 1960, with little visible results. In
November, 1960, General Lauris Norstad proposed to make NATO
a "fourth nuclear power" with a multilateral atomic force
which would give the alliance control over nuclear components
now held exclusively in United States custody. He spoke of
"extremely mobile units, some of which operate by sea and some
8of which operate by land."
The Eisenhower Administration initially embraced the Nor-
stad proposal in an effort to counteract the Soviet threat
that had developed when the U.S.S.R. began to deploy large
numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) in western
Russia and the Eastern satellite countries. However, upon
further consideration, this plan was rejected. It was argued
that large numbers of missiles moving constantly throughout
Europe would disquiet the population and encourage neutralist
tendencies.
9
Accordingly, a State Department study group headed by
professor Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Harvard Center for
International Affairs, suggested that NATO's MRBM requirement
be met by Polaris missiles installed on surface vessels and/or
submarines. They were to be owned, maintained, and operated
by all members who wished to participate in the program. Each
8NATO News Letter, January, 1961, pp. 15-17.
9Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York:McGraw-Hill, 196!3), pp. 123-129.
9
ship was to be manned by crews of mixed nationality, and each
participant was to have a veto over the use of these forces.i°
This study made by Bowie had been requested by Secretary
of State Christian Herter. The majn guidelines of this pro-
posal became the "Herter Suggestion" for a NATO cooperative
nuclear force, which ultimately led to the MLF concept. As
Cyrus Sulzberger describes it: "Herter adopted Norstad's ideas
about making NATO a fourth atomic power and shook them up in a
cocktail with the thoughts of Robert Bowie."11
The Herter Proposal was presented at the NATO ministerial
meeting in December of 1960. It was at this time that the Sec-
retary of State proposed a "new concept for the operation of
medium-range ballistic missiles." 
12 
This so-called "new con-
cept" committed five American submarines, to be armed wJ_th
eighty Polaris missiles, to the NATO Alliance. In return,
other members would be expected to jointly purchase from the
United States one hundred additional Polaris missiles. He ex-
plained that if our allies provided the additional Polaris mis-
siles on a multilaterally manned, owned, and controlled basis
the United States would combine its five submarines with this
contribution into a NATO deterrent force under NATO command.
The question of control was left for subsequent consideration.13
i°Ibid.
11The New York Times, February
12-The New York Times, December
22, 1961, p. 24.
17, 1960, p. 1.
13
Christian A. Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community (New
York: Harper-Row, 1963), pp. 41-42.
10
Lack of any immediate action on this proposal was due to
the fact that the old Republican Administration was in the pro-
cess of leaving office and most Europeans understandably cre-
ferred to await the views and actions of the .ew, Dr.mocratic,
Kennedy Administration. For a period of some months these new
policy makers studied NATO strategy and concluded that greater
emphasis should be placed on conventional forces. This change
of interest, opposing the previous concept of massive retalia-
tion, coincided with the new policy of flexible response as ad-
vocated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Such a defense
posture, according to the new administration, was designed to
develop the Western defense lino so that the allies could be
capable of containing any type of aggressive action without
having to resort to total, all-out nuclear war in every situ-
ation. This was a safeguard against overreaction. Such a
position would enhance the credibility of the deterrence cap-
acity of the NATO forces.
There were obvious actions in which a nuclear deterrent
would be appropriate, but there remained a large set of con-
flicts, for example in Berlin, or on the outlying areas of NATO,
which would call for a limited response. Consequently, conven-
tional rather than nuclear forces seemed to be the pressing need
for the 1960's. President John F. Kennedy reflected this line
of thought in his speech to the Canadian Parliament on May 17,
1961. He emphasized his conviction that NATO, to meet its de-
fense requirements, must push forward simultaneously along two
major lines. Most important was the strengthening of the
remained
11
conventional capability of the alliance. Secondly, the avail-
ability of nuclear weapons for defense purposes were to have
high priority. He committed five Polaris atomic missile sub-
marines to the NATO command area, and spoke of "eventually es-
tablishing a NATO seaborne missile force, which would be truly
multilateral in ownership and control, once NATO's non-nuclear
goals have been achieved."
14
The European allies were not particularly responsive to
the President's speech. Conventional build-up was resisted on
three counts: (1) that it might weaken the credibility cf the
nuclear deterrent; (2) that it was very expensive; (3) and
that it would do no good in view of the presumed superiority
in numbers of the Warsaw Pact troops. Also, the missile gap
theory, stimulated by the launch of the Soviet
15in Western Europe.a grave concern
Sputnik, still
The precondition of a conventional force build-up sug-
gested that the MLF project was not considered highly urgent
by the United States or by the majority of the NATO members.
The European allies felt that they could ill afford to simul-
taneously strengthen their conventional forces and contribute
to a NATO nuclear force. There followed a year of decreasing
interest in the MLF scheme. In fact, at the regular NATO
14U.S.  Department of State Bulletin XLIV, (June 5, 1961)No. 1145, p. 841. "The Common Aims of Canada and the UnitedStates," Speech by President John F. Kennedy at Ottawa, May17, 1961.
'William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York:Harper-Row, 1964), pp. 107-08.
12
with ether NATO allies.
Ministerial Conference in December of 1962, the United States
took no initiative with respect to this po1icy.
1.6
An indication of the lack of commitment concerning the
MLF preea1 nay be illustrated by the fact that one week fol-




Great Britain, announced its intention
missiles to British owned and operated
to be assigned within five years to
multinational submarine force,
17
in the closest consultation
The meeting between President
a
Kennedy and Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan, held at Nassau in December, 1962, out of
which this joint communique emerged, was resultant of the
United States' decision to cancel the Skybolt missile program.
Great Britain had concluded that its own strategic missile pro-
gram, the Bluestreak, was a failure. With the cancellation of
this project, Britain desired to purchase the United States' air-
to-surface ballistic missile, the Skybolt. The discontinuation
of the research and planned production of this missile (Skybolt)
severely limited the British independent nuclear capability.
Whereas, the Skybolt was a long-range air-to-ground missile,
which prolonged the technical capacity of British independent
operation and control of the Strategic Command of the Royal
Air Force, the technical qualities of the Polaris system
16 Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 129.
17
U.S. Department of State Bulletin XLVIII, (January 14,1963) No.1229, p. 44. "Text: Joint Communique and AttachedStatement on Nuclear Defense Systems," by President Kennedyand Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau, December 21, 1962.
13
excluded such independent operation. Under this system (Polari.
the British strategic nuclear submarines were dependent upon
the availability of American systems of navigational aids, es-
pecially satellite. Because of such dependency, th2 British
acceptance of the Nassau terms was regarded by many European
states (especially France) as a surrender of Great Britain's
capacity for independent nuclear action.
As a result of such agreement concluded between Britain
and the United States at Nassau, Great Britain missed a unique
opportunity to convert their nuclear arsenal into a real asset.
Rather than to continue to pursue the mirage of an independent
nuclear force (although it was now directly dependent on the
use of United States satellites), Britain could have proposed
to join the other members of the European Community in the de-
velopment of an integrated joint nuclear force. Such a propo-
sal would have demonstrated to the European states that "Britain
had cast her lot with the Community and that de Gaulle's 'Euro-
pean' claims were hollow if he would not take 
part.u18
President Charles de Gaulle's response to the Nassau Agree-
ment came in the form of a press conference on January 14, 1963.
When asked about the French pcsition concerning the proposed
multilateral nuclear force, as advocated by the Nassau Agree-
ment, de Gaulle stated that "to turn over our weapons to a mul-
tilateral force, under foreign command, would be to act contrary
18Robert R. Bowie, "Tensions Within the Alliance,"Foreign Affairs, XLII, (October, 1963), pp. 49-69.
14
to the principles of our defense and our policy."
19
He also
indicated that it would be useless for France to
Polaris missiles offered by the United States in




to launch nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm them.
French fear of American domination was also expressed by
that country's opposition to the entry of Great Britain into
the Common ?larket (EEC) because of the "special" relationship
that Britain had with the United States. In effect, de Gaulle
proclaimed that the English were linked too closely, economic-
ally, militarily (Nassau) and traditionally, with a crowd of




"cohesion" of the Atlantic Community would soon
"American dependence and leadership wh'eh would
the European Community."
20
Finally, in this January 14, press conference, the French
President contributed to a further splintering of opinion with-
in NATO as he hinted of a Franco-German treaty of cooperation.
When asked if Germany could be equipped with and have control
of nuclear weapons, he replied: "It is evident that there is
a close solidarity between the defense of Germany and that of
France, but it is up to Federal Germany to say what it wishes
and to conduct its own policy.“21
19
Charles de Gaulle, Maior Addresses, Statements and Press 
Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle: May 19, 1958-January




The French veto in 1963, of British membership in the Com-
mon Market, was fundamentally connected with an already existing
basic European-American dispute that developed in the relations
of the Old World with the New World during the post World War
II years. This lessening of cohesion is amply exemplified in
the proposal for and debate concerning a NATO multilateral nu-
clear force. Essentially, emerging Europe was desirous of a
more self-respecting role in the European-American relationship.
This desire had developed quite strongly by 1963 and was stead-
ily becoming stronger. Europeans felt that it was time
dress the balance within the NATO Alliance. Europe was




United States had changed since the immediate post-war years
of disunity and disparity. In other words, Europe felt that
its present role did not appear to correctly reflect such
changes or to be in line with Europe's relative growth in
strength and unity.
22
With such enhanced confidence, the Euro-
pean members of NATO desired a larger more responsible role in
the planning and execution of Alliance strategy, and control
over the forces for its defense, especially nuclear.
French insistence on an independent national nuclear force,
coupled with her overtures of cooperation with the Federal
Republic, made the MLF the central fccus for the United States
during 1963. It was believed by the Kennedy Administration that
the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force would limit
nuclear aspirations, especially with respect to Germany.
22Bowie, "Tensions Within the Alliance." p. 53.
16
In line with this belief, President Kennedy quickly dis-
patched Livingston Merchant in March, 1963 (his Special Ambas-
sador) to Europe in order to explain in depth the United States'
pyopc- a4 :11t...iatera1 nuclear force. Such a force would
consist of twenty-five surface ships loaded with nuclear-armed
Polaris missiles with a maximum range of 2,500 miles. These
ships would have crews of mixed nationalities, and would be con-
trolled by a multinational board drawn from those NATO member
states that provided ships, crews, port facilities, or




realizing that both defense plans (nuclear and conventional)
would possibly prove too costly for most countries, dropped
the previous prior condition of conventional force build-up.
The proposal for a NATO controlled multilateral force con-
tinued as a major premise of American foreign policy through the
following two years (1963-64), as the Johnson Administration
took office. The initial reaction in Europe to this proposal
was civil but far from enthusiastic. As American pressure (both
official and unofficial) increased, country after country de-
clined support for the proposal (lessening of cohesion). Canada,
Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and especially France expressed no
interest at all in any form of participation, while the smaller
and poorer members were concerned with the potential cost of
even a small share of such a force. Many of the naval staffs
235, I. Coffey, "A NATO Nuclear Deterrent?," Orbis VII
:Fall, 1964), p. 584.
17
of the countries involved were doubtful, if not highly skep-
tical, concerning the operational viability of such a force.
Public opinion seemed generally disinterested and in SCAM-,
cases open 3 hostile. No one could see how the 1.,7 . ohlein ol el--
trol was going to be solved. The United Kingdom had atfirst
hesitantly supported the proposal but became increasingly op-
posed as Washington continued to pressure her for a definite
commitment.
24
The relationships (cohesion) within the North
Atlantic alliance were sorely strained over this issue.
The signing of the treaty pertaining to the establishment
of a multilateral force was to be completed by the end of 1964,
with ratification in early 1965. Britain, far from being to-
tally supportive, was expected not to refuse the project since
it had advanced so far (a new. Labor Party had just taken of-
fice,. Smaller countries would follow the British lead.
France had a choice, so the reasoning went, to cooperate or
to be isolated.'-'5
By December, 1964, no treaty had been completed. However,
it still seemed possible that some kind of force, to include
at least Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and the
United States might yet emerge.
French opposition came into the open as American pressure
increased, and Germany was caught in the struggle between its
closest allies. The Secretary General of NATO announced that
in his opinion, a unanimous consent would be required in the
24A1.astair Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical
Perspective," Adephi Papers, No. 13 (October, 1964), p. 12.
2
5Kssnger, Th Troubled Partnership. p. 1 -ii e
18
setting up of a multilateral force, thus giving the opposing
countries an effective veto. The MLF initiated in the hope of
furthering allied cohesion, had become an element of discord.
Ahiatus of approximately o-- e year olrapE,-d, as 1-1,-:::cpc
America awaited the outcome of the German elections which took
place in September, 1965. During this interim period, a new
factor arose which sealed the fate of the MLF. The United
Nations Disarmament Committee, dormant for several years, was
activated when the Soviet Union evidenced an interest in a
treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to
non-nuclear powers. Russia specifically referred to the multi-
lateral nuclear force proposal.
Although the Western countries rejected the Russian sug-
gestion, it was successful in splintering opinion in an already
divisive scene. Many saw the anti-dissemination treaty as an
important step toward world peace. Even West Germany, the most
ardent European supporter of the MLF proposal, now expressed
reservations. On December 21, 1965, during a state visit to
Washington, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and President Lyndon B.
Johnson buried the MLF in silence, promising that the issue of
nuclear control would be discussed again at some date in the
near future.
27
The multilateral nuclear force debate, which
had spanned a five year period, had ceased to be a viable part
of American NATO policy at this point.
261bia.
27Harold van B. Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and Its Euro-
pean Rivals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 60-63.
CHAPTER III
(XNCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES 
The implementation of a multilateral nuclear force within
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had as one of its main
objectives the strengthening of cohesion within the Alliance.
With the ultimate failure of this project, a lack of cohesion
within NATO became vividly apparent.
Any international organization,whether it be civil or mil-
itary, becomes more effective with the development of a higher
degree of cohesion among its major members concerning basic
policies. NAtO is aggregative or collective in nature. Thus,
a necessary element of such a group is cohesiveness or to-
getherness. "Either it fc-ohesiog reaches a meaningful level
or an alliance is simply academic."
28
An alliance derives its solidarity from common goals or
purposes. The amount of cohesion is relative to the group's
vitality as opposed to its durability. The greatest basis for
unity within an alliance is a common agreement on matters di-
rectly bearing on the reason(s) for establishing the group,
such as those concerned with the defense of the member terri-
tories from conventional or nuclear aggression.29 However,
military strategy is not an isolated function of alliances or






their members, but is an integrating component of the overall
policy (both foreign and domestic) of allied partner states.
Politics and military strategy are ultimately inseparable.
30
An additional factor which bears directly on cohesion, or
the lack of cohesion, within an alliance is that all objectives
of that group be clearly and precisely defined. In a time of
war, alliance cohesion is clearly shown through the mutual
actions against a common enemy. In time of peace there are
few conclusive signs of unification. In such a situation each
alliance member is caught in a web of lingering doubts concern-
ing his relationship with others.
One of the direct causes of divisions within the Atlantic
Alliance was General Charles de Gaulle and his actions. But
no one single individual nor country was responsible for all
the tensions and divisions of NATO. President de Gaulle in-
tensified and capitalized on several serious strains arising
from other (existing) sources within the North Atlantic Com-
munity and within Europe. For an adequate diagnosis, it is
necessary to put these deeper causes, such as economic, social,
political, and military differences, into their proper perspec-
tive. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a defensive
military alliance operating under peace time conditions. As
such, it has failed to retain many of the cchesive qualities
that originally made such a grouping imperative. NATO was con-
ceived as a defense aoainst what was considered to be an immed-
iate attack by massive communist forces across the borders of
30Kurt Birrenbach, "European Integration and Atlantic Part-nership," in NATO In Quest of Cohesion, ed. by Carl H. Cerny andHenry Briefs (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 285.
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Western Europe. Its origins were derived in the inability ofthe Allied powers of World War II to make an adequate settle-ment. With the defeat of the Axis powers, and the presence oflarge numbers of Soviet forces in central Europe, the time ap-peared ripe for ccmmunist power and influence to spread deep
into Western Europe. It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty
that the development of a defensive alliance (NATO) was con-
strued. Mutual fears and aspirations helped to cement the bondsof the NATO agreement.
NATO, created in a time of crisis, developed its contem-
porary shape and form from a sustained period of tension. Thefact that there seems to be an apparent relaxation in East-Westrelations has subjected the alliance to a multitude of new
strains. The absence of unmistakable pressure, specifically ofa military nature, has contributed to the loosening of ties
within the Western Alliance.
31
The original objectives of NATOseem less pressing, and thus are less a reason for strong cohe-sive relations among the members. Such an alliance, moreover,is likely to be far more unified on reasons for resisting a
common enemy than on teims for accommodating allied states.
The tacts that the Soviet combat forces in Eastern Europehad seemingly been substantially reduced, that they had been
supplied with tactical nuclear weapons, and that the Soviet
Union had set in place approximately seven hundred and fifty
nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe and capable of
31Hans 3. Morgenthau, "The Crisis of the Alliance," in
NATO In Quest of Cohesion, ed. by Karl H. Cerny and Henry W.
Briefs (Ncw York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 285.
22
covering every major target there, gave credence to the pre-
vailing view held by many western leaders in late 1963, that
the main n=pose of Ru.ssiar. military p:] icy Ful-opc2 was :.ot
aggression or military pressure but rather nuclear deterrence.
3i
However, if one were to realistically (objectively) view the
Warsaw Pact area and its military organization, that is, as con-
cerns the character of total military dependence on Moscow and
the entire military entity of Eastern Europe, it would be
clearly noted that to some degree nothing has been changed
through detente. Evidently, the Soviet military forces insure,
through the use and/or threat of military power, that the mil-
itary organization of the Eastern bloc countries remain com-
pletely untouched by the up and downs of the Kremlin's tactics
of tension and detente.
33
This point was vividly demonstrated
by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in summer 1968.
If militarily the Soviet Union seemed as much on the de-
fersive as the West, the ideological convictions and political
ambitions of its leaders appeared to be no longer eminently rel-
evant to the security of NATO. It appeared to many of the
statesmen of the western world that the tense and seemingly in-
namable confrontation had gradually subsided into a stalemate.34
In this limited sense the "cold war" in Europe was now a thing
32Alistair Buchan, "The Balance of Power," in Defense:  AFinancial Times Survey (London: Time Ltd., March 23, 1964),p. 17.
33Alfons Dalma, "The Risks of a Detente Policy to CentralEurope," in Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West, ed. by Arnold Wolfers (Paltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press1964), p. 121.
34Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals,pp. 8-9.
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of the past. Some indices of this trend toward the easing of
tensions (détente) may be drawn from the facts that by 1965:
(1) although young Americans were still subject to a two year
riLita-zy draft, 1., ost ;;estern European countries had reduced
theirs to eighteen months or, as in the case of the Federal
Republic of Germany, to one year. The United Kinodom had elim-
inated conscription entirely. (2) Britain refrained from in-
creasing her land forces on the Continent. (3) And France re-
fused even to cooperate with the NATO conunand in natters of
strategic planning. Both the United Kingdom and France had ig-
nored the American wish for a limitation of nuclear prolifer-
ation and the development of independent national nuclear
forces, thus failing to aid one another diplomatically, while
at the same time Western Europe had substantially increased its
trade with the Soviet bloc.
35 
Although there exists no conclusi\
attachment nor relationship between trade and detente, the in-
crease in East-West trade must be mentioned because of its im-
pact on the relations between the states of the NATO Alliance.
Most prominent disagreements within the Western Alliance
concerning trade (lessening cohesion) have been, on the whole,
limited to questions of East-West trade, the embargo on strate-
gic materials, and the granting of credits. The difference of
opinion arising over such questions have been partly due to com-
mercial considerations. A country such as England, whose for-
eign commerce forms a large proportion of her whole econemic ac-
tivity, was more averse to limit trade with the Communist bloc
35Ronald Steel, The  End of Alliance: America and the Futureof Eurcpe (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 196.4), p. 140.
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countries on political grounds than Aserica, whose commercial
interests were relatively insignificant in comparison. 
36
In 1950, Foviet export and import orade with non-communist
countries totaled five hundred and fifoy million dollars. In
1963 Soviet import/export trade with the non-communist world
had risen to four billion dollars. In this same year (1963)
nine to ten billion dollars worth of total communist trade con-
sisted of exports to and imports from non-communist countries.
For example, West Germany exchanged about one billion dollars
worth of goods with the various communist countries. The Brit-
ish imported Soviet timber in large quantities and exported
substantial amounts of machinery to that country. Even the
United States, upon finding itself with a large surplus of
37
wheat, exported it to the Soviet Union.
Another major indicator of a relaxation of tensions in
East-West relations may be drawn from the figures for the total
percent of NATO members gross national products (GNP) expended
for military defense for the years 1945-1967.38 One may con-
clude from these figures that, since the tension-laden years
1951-P-)54, with the death of Joseph Stalin on March 3, 1953,
the subsequent power shift in the Soviet Government, and the
outbreak and conclusion of the Rorean conflict (June 1950-
July 1953), the percent expended for defense hat been
36Kenneth Younger, "Relaxation of East-West Tension and
Its Effect Upon the West," in Chanainc East-West Relations 
and the Unity of the West, ed. by ArnoLd Wolfers (Baltimore:
The johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 9.
37
Harold Perman, "A Reappraisal cf the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade
Policy," Harvard Business Review, XLIII ..7.s1y-August, 1964),
p. 140.
38For 1 more diled listing of fas-s and figures of
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Fignic 2. NATO and Warsaw Pact Divisions and
Amy Headquarters in Germany
39Carl Ammo, Jr., NATO Without France (Stanford:
HoovQr Institutions Publications, 1967), p. 85.
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significantly reduced, although the total cash value has in-
creased slightly due to a rising standard of living in the
countries concerned.
IM.is feeling of detente was strengthened by the convic-tion of both the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact countries
that the two main nuclear powers would avoid a direct military
confrontation for an indefinite period. Such examples of
Washington-Moscow cooperation as the establishment of a direct
line of communication (the hot-line) in 1,.ugust, 1963, talks of
possible troop disengagement in Europe, and moves toward non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons added credence to this belief.
A nuclear test-ban treaty was signed by more than one hundred
countries in 1963. Disappointing as this treaty was, in the
sense that it failed to pave the way for a system of mutual
arms inspection, it was the first formal expression of a common
interest between the United States and the Soviet Union concern-ing the control of nuclear weapons.
40
Rumored United States-Soviet Union bilateral discussions
were met by agreement among some NATO members and by suspicion
by others. For example, on April 20, 1964, Soviet and American
pledges for cutbacks in fissionable materials for use in nu-
clear weapons was simultaneously announced. White House sour-
ces reported that the decisions had been made during a recent
series of private conversations between President Lyndon B.
Johnson and Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Such actions by the
40
Younger, "Relaxation of East-West Tension and ItsEffect Upon the West, p. 5.
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United States illuminated the growing skepticism among the
members of the Western Alliance. For example, England gave
its consent to the agreement a day following the announcement.




As the impression grew that bilateral Soviet-United States
negotiations were proceeding, nationalistic tendencies seemed
to have been stimulated. The issue was not whether the United
States would conclude an agreement contrary to the wishes of
its allies. It was rather that in an alliance of sovereign
states (NATO) each state will conclude that it is a better
judge of its own requirements and will not always be prepared
to allow another state to negotiate for it in matters of na-
tional concern (lack of trust). This atmosphere of "detente"
between the two superpowers (United States and the Soviet
Union) removes, or in the least reduces, the previous urgency
for cohesion within international military coalitions.42
Other factors, in addition to the easing of tensions be-
tween the East and West, had contributed to the lack of cohe-
sion that existed within the North Atlantic Alliance by the
mid 196C's. Geographically speaking, the difficulty in co-
ordinating the interests of the United States, with those of
smaller European countries is obvious. As an example, the
41
Facts on File: World News Digest (New York:File Inc., April 16-22, 1964). p. 5.
42
Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 10.
Facts on
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interest and goals of the allies in their mutual security ar-
rangements differ.
The United States, separated from Asia and Europe, still
relatively safe from conventional invasion, espoused strategic
doctrines and deployments whose main emphasis was on prevent-
ing general thermonuclear war. Europeans were naturally more
sensitive than Americans to the dangers and destruction of a
so-called "limited conflict" that would be confined to European
soil. They (Europeans), accordingly, proposed strategies,
force dispositions, troop deployments and types of weapon
systems whose emphasis was total deterrence of any military
action of even a limited nature. The Western Europeans were
indeed uncomfortable with various aspects of the Robert McNamara
strategy of a "flexible response."
43
They were especially op-
posed to such doctrines as the "firebreak" or "nuclear pause."
The core of this policy was: "given an attack by Soviet con-
ventional forces, U. S. defense would be limited to counter-
conventional forces."
44
This theory advanced the belief that
such confinement to strictly conventional weapons, in view of
a conventional attack, would create a military stalemate
(pause) during which time both sides would have political nego-
tiating possibilities, avoiding the use of nuclear weapons.
The Europeans, who had lived through two great conventional
wars in less than fifty years, felt that the "pause" philosophy
43For a programmed description of the flexible response
Strategy: se Appendix A, page 56 of this report.
44Di
ctionary of Political Science, ed. Joseph Dunner, (Toto-
wa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1970), P. 380.
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of flexible response was too costly for the benefits promised.
Andre Beaufre, a well-known French strategic theorist,
explainc,d that Europe was instinctively hostile to any doctrine
proposing any form of limited war. He concluded that Europeans
generally preferred total peace by great danger, rather than to
see Europe again become a theater of even minor or limited
military operations.
45
NATO's problems also had economic roots. Although the
loss of cohesion that had developed because of them was of
secondary rank compared with the disagreement due to nuclear
issues, economic policy differences were important determin-
ants of the future of the NATO alliance.
46
A marked revision
in the relative economic strengths of the European members of
NATO had developed by the early 1960's. Europe had experi-
enced one of the most remarkable periods of sustained economic
growth in the history of capitalist countries. The standard
of living of this area (Western Europe) had increased to the
point where the Europeans could carry a much larger share of
the economic burdens of the western alliance and could insist
on a greater role in leading it.
The most important single outcome of the economic re-
surgence of Europe has been the development of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) or Common Market. This strong economic
45Andre Beaufre, "Dissuasuion et Strategic." Survival(March-April, 1965), p. 56.
46Lawrence B. Krause, "Economic Problems," in NATO InQuest of Cohesion, ed. by Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 65.
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grouping enabled its members to gain some measure of indepen-
dence from the United States. European independence had two
faces. On the one hand, independence meant that Europe could
shoulder a larger share of defense cost, would provide greater
resources for the have-not countries, and would in general take
on more of the responsibilities of the free world. On the
other hand, independence also meant a rejection of United
States' leadership and all that this implied.
47
Net only did the creation of a trade organization (EEC)
within Western Europe cause a change in United States-European
relations, but it also caused additional social and economic
clevages within Europe itself. Not all of the Western European
Alliance members belonged to the EEC. England was indifferent
to the idea and hostile to institutional arrangements which
impinged upon its national sovereignty. Her early decision





ation. The purpose of
These countries joined England in or-
group, the European Free Trade Associ-
this association was threefold: (1) to
provide an economic offset to the member countries for the
loss they might suffer from not being a member of the stronger
Common Market; (2) to demonstrate the technical feasibility of
the free trade area technique; (3) and to provide a bargaining







From the standpoint of Atlantic unity, the establishment
in Western Europe of two separate and distinct free-trade areas
with tariff barriers between them was not a healthy development.
Germany ae- d were members of the more ilapressi7:, Europeae
Economic Community while England was one of several European
countries that comprised the European Free Trade Association.
Both of these groups had enjoyed a measure of economic success.
However, this success was deceptive, in that it made the social,
political and ecenomic cleavages of Europe more ominous. The
more each group succeeded in directing the trade of member
countries toward other member countria:; of the same group, the
greater became the welfare loss of trade diversion. Since NATO
member states were present in both economic organizations the
military, diplomatic, and cohesive consequences to this al-
liance had to be assumed.
Great Britain, having faced up to the fact that her entry
into the Common Market would be to her national betterment,
applied for membership into that group. It was clear from the
start that negotiations would be very difficult. Some tentative
settlements had been reached, but many difficult problems re-
mained to be solved when the negotiations were abruptly halted
in January of 1963 by the unilateral actions of President
Charles de Gaulle.
It is difficult to know all the factors that went into
de Gaulle's decision to exclude Britain from membership in the
Common Market, but certainly the issue of nuclear armaments
played a major part. When the United States cancelled the
32
Skybolt missile project, a crisis develcped for British stra-
tegic planning since they counted upon this missile to con-
tribute to their nuclear weapons delivery systems. The
choice made by Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau was to ac-
cept continued dependence upon the United States by agreeing
to rely on Polaris-type missiles. This was in direct con-
tradiction to the independent concept as espoused by the Euro-
pean Economic Community, and especially in relation to the
stand taken by French President de Gaulle.
49
It is self-evident that politicc-military collaboration
cannot exist where there is economic friction. The North At-
lantic Treaty Organization was severely divided on economic
issues during the 1960's.
From the preceding material one may conclude that, by the
early 1960's, the NATO Alliance was losing much of the cohe-
sion that characterized its formation. The reduction of East-
West tensions, geographic differences, economic problems and
differing views by individual members concerning defense stra-
tegies had placed new and severe strains on the alliance. It
was in this divisive atmosphere that the multilateral nuclear
force was proposed. This force, which had originally been
conceived as an instrument for establishing closer relations
among the NATO members and thwarting independent nuclear aspir-
ations, in fact amplified the lack of cohesion within this1
organization and seemed to have accelerated the movement to-
ward independent nuclear forces.
49Ibid., p. 309.
CHAPTER IV
NATO AND NUCLEAR SHARING: THE MLF
The proposal for the establishment of a multilateral nu-
clear force and the debate which ensued within the councils
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization demonstrated a
variety of weaknesses in the relations between the members of
this alliance. A lack of agreement (cohesion) among the member
states concerning the degree of emphasis that should be placed
on such a force as a policy of nuclear deterrence was amply
shown. This proposal also exemplified the lack of cohesion
within NATO due to the presence of national pride and -1.aims
of sovereignty. Essentially, the proposal for and the debate
concerning the MLF was a prime example of the divisive nature
of intra-alliance politics, common in most international mili-
tary coalitions.
Politics may be analyzed as human activities where more or
less unequal participants debate, discuss and openly compete,
under a system of coercion, to achieve advantages and/or avoid
disadvantages in the acquisition of goals or ends. Bargaining
is a central component of such a process, however it is quite
common for power and prestige to be utilized in a coercive man-
ner in order to achieve ends. "The Process also operates in
50
Friedman, Alliance in International Politics, p. 7.
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the endless conflicts between nations and between international
blocs.
51
 Therefore, such a description can to some degree be
applied to the field of international relations. This can be
seen by the United States' efforts to create a workable mul-
tilateral nuclear force within the framework of NATO.
In this highly competitive atmosphere, such problems as
the political control of nuclear weapons become most acute.
Political control of nuclear weapons goes far beyond the basic
strategic and military considerations. The multilateral nuclear
force, advanced as a means to solve this problem, foundered
on such basic issues as: a lack of consensus concerning the
degree of emphasis to be placed on the MLF (by each potential
participant) as a policy of nuclear deterrence; a lack of
agreement on the delegation of authority (national sovereignty);
a lack of clear understanding of the structural organization
to be utilized; a lack of nuclear deterrent value due to the
various levels and types of veto powers; and a lack of trust
that once the casus foderis arose, the partners would meet
their stated commitments.
The MLF was presented to the members of NATO as a proposed
method of sharing nuclear responsibility within the Alliance.
Could there actually be a sharing of such an awesome (life
and death) issue? A major factor relevant to this question
was that, by the early 1960 1 s, the Soviet Union had so advanced
in the development of nuclear weaponry that a degree of nuclear
51Bertram M. Gross, "Political Process," International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences XII (New York: Macmillan
Co., and the Free ryess, 1968), p. 265.
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equality (parity) between the two super powers (the United
States and Russia) was evident. The importance of this new
Soviet nuclear capability was reflected in the fact that the
United States was forced to revise its foreign policy. No
longer (due to the possibility of mutual destruction) was the
past policy of massive retaliation feasible.
Now the American constituency and consequently American
foreign policy began to stress the high priority of possible
arms control, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, forms of
crisis management and general East-West citente. Such foreign
policy revisions were made within the American constituency
an expression of national sovereignty), excluding the in-
fluence of the Allies.
Sovereignty has always been a stumbling-block to effective
intra-alliance cohesion. This has been especially true in
relation to the sharing of weapons and defense systems among
alliance members. This problem is greatly complicated when
considering weapons mass destruction. Under such circum-
stances each country, quite naturally, considers itself to be
the best judge of it: own destiny, and attempts, though not
always successfully, to make and/or influence decisions in its
own best interest.
The United States has had a long-standing aversion to the
sharing of nuclear responsibilities, as is expressed by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which legally prohibited the dis-
semination of atomic information or of fissionable materials
to any foreign government. This act was amended in 1954,
allowing the United States to cooperate more freely with those
36
foreign governments recognized as nuclear powers under the
act, for example Great Britain.
The achievement of nuclear parity between Moscow and
Washington intensified this ieluctance to share nuclear res-
ponsibility by the American public. This, in turn, had a
negative effect upon the relationships within the Atlantic
Alliance. Due to the very nature of nuclear power, responsib-
ility in this field cannot be shared among the members of an
alliance. Thus, when an international alliance, for example
NATO, confronts such a problem, the loss of a certain amount
of cohesion is inevitable.
The MLF proposal proved difficult for the United States
to present for it was an extraordinarily complicated project
on which there was no clear consensus within NATO. There ex-
isted a lack of clarity about the real objectives to be achieved
by the MLF. It became the focus for a variety of diverse
hopes, and the supporters of the MLF proposal had many con-
tradictory motives. As Mr. Kissinger has pointed out:
It was supposed to revitalize NATO, yet reduce the
role of France in Europe. It was to prevent nuclear
proliferation and yet satisfy alleged German desires
for a share of nuclear control. It simultaneously
sought to meet requirements of the Pentagon for cen-
tral control over nuclear weapons and the hopes of
many Europeans for the emergence of a European nuclear
force. 52
Much of the divisiveness concerning this proposal stemmed
from the indecisive nature of American defense strategy of the
early 1960's. Washington incessantly urged NATO member states
to increase and modernize their conventional force levels and,
52Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 139.
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to allay European fears about the availability of nuclear wea-
pons in times of crisis, proposed the multilateral nuclear
force. NATO members, some of whom desired a greater voice in
the formulation of defense strategies, were dissatisfied with
both proposals. The European nations, in short, were skept-
ical of the new policy of "flexible response," especially in
regard to such aspects as the so-called nuclear pause and trans-
parent strategy. Many Europeans remained deeply committed to
the defense posture of massive retaliation, as it has been
construed under the concept of an American nuclear umbrella.
53
A great deal of the confasion concerning the proposal for
the MLF may have been due to the shifting and changing emphasis
placed on the importance of this program by the United St31:es.
In the early 1960's the United States continued to stress con-
ventional arms build-up by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion member states. Administration spokesmen invited American
allies to analyze the problem of nuclear control within the
Alliance and to develop a mutually satisfactory control plan.
Dean Rusk stressed that it was up to the Europeans to formulate
a concrete proposal: "We have not ourselves put forward a
precise plan," he announced, "... this is something that our
friends across the Atlantic would presumably wish to do."
54
Such prior conditiens put forth by Washington, concerning con-
ventional build-up and European control plans, suggested that
the United States originally did not consider the MLF scheme
53Wallace C. Magathan, Jr., "West German Defense Policy,"Orbis VIII (Summer, 1964), p. 293.
54U.S. Department of State Pulletin XLVII, (December 31,1962) No. 1227, p. 995.
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totally nor eminently urgent. Given the fact that none of
the American allies possessed sea-borne nuclear systems at
the time the offer was made and that a command and control
system even for a single national force was a complicated
matter, the probability that United States' allies would
develop a meaningful control system was remote.
55
There was an abrupt change in the American approach which
appeared to have been linked with two events: (1) the press
conference of French President Charles de Gaulle in January,
1963; and (2) the signing of a Franco-German Treaty of coopera-
tion in February of this same year. The multilateral nuclear
program was suddenly thrust into the forefront of American
foreign policy, apparently as a means to thwart President de
Gaulle's European objectives and to eliminate the possibility
of their having an effect on the Federal Republic of Germany.
It was not until the political meaning of Charles de Gaulle's
veto in January, 1963 of British entry into the Common Market
had been grasped in Washington that the Kennedy Administration,
although still somewhat hesitantly, began to throw its full
diplomatic weight behind the MLF proposal. Such a change of
emphasis, with its concurrent increase of tempo, appeared to
have been intended essentially to avert a possible Franco-German
military collaboration, with the implicit danger that it would
lead to some kind of independent German nuclear deterrent, or
to German participation in a Franco-German nuclear agreement.
55Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 129-30.
56Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals,p. 56.
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This sudden switch of policy was thrust upon a bewildered,
divided alliance.
Military specialists usually agree that it is impossible
to suddenly change from one strategy to another without suf-
fering some type of adverse consequences. This is especially
true when one has to deal with an arsenal containing weapons
as divergent as conventional and nuclear armaments. Henry
Kissinger, for example, predicted that once committed to a
conventional defense system, the country that decided to switch
to nuclear weapons would be lost.
57
 Reflecting the general
European view against conventional war, Franz-Josef Strauss,
former West German Minister of Defense, warned:
A conventional war would produce such unimaginable
destruction to Europe that one can not consider it
the lesser evil ... In our exposed geographical
position one can not warn loudly enough against the
concept that we could eliminate the nuclear weapon
and thereby open the valve of conventional war.D8
One must conclude that the Federal Republic's apparent
support of the MLF was not based on a belief that such a plan
held any promise of real participation in control of nuclear
warheads, but rather on the assumption that it would be a new
and stronger- link in the American nuclear guarantee to Europe.
West Germany primarily desired to retain a strong relationship
with the United States by demonstrating its "reliability" as an
57Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of
Europe," Orbis VII (Summer, 1963), p. 245. See also Henry
Kissinger, "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear," Fifteen 
Nations, (March, 1961).
58
Franz-Josef Strauss, "Speech before International Students
in Bonn, (July 28, 1962), quote from Wallace C. Magathan, Jr.
"West German Defense Policy," Orbis VIII (Summer, 1964), p. 296.
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ally and hoped that such participation would enhance its abil-
ity to influence American foreign policy.
59
The smaller countries within NATO, generally wanted no
direct association with nuclear weapons; they felt most secure
under the "nuclear umbrella" of the United States. Also such
countries, already involved in a conventional force build-up,
found it financially impractical to incur the added expense of
a nuclear defense, but felt compelled to join various MLF study
groups because of the wish not to alienate the senior ally.
60
Countries which were potentially major contributors to a
multilateral nuclear force were deeply involved in their own
nuclear projects or, lacking any detailed blueprint from the
United States, believed the problem to be insoluble. France,
for example, refused to entertain the idea of a NATO nuclear
force. This refusal was admittably based upon political as
well as technical reasons. Politically speaking, participa-
tion in such an integrated force was contrary to French policy
as that country was determined to develop its own independent
nuclear force. Technically, France was far less advanced than
England in the nuclear field and it would prove difficult if
not impossible for France to participate in an Atlantic nuclear
59
Donald Brandon, American Foreion Policy: Beyond Utopian-ism and Realism (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), po.185. See also Fritz Erler, "Paper dated October 13, 1964, pre-pared for meeting of the Atlantik-Brucke and the American Coun-cil on Germany," (Berlin: November 12-15, 1964), mimeographed,p. 7.
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club and still be able to advance her technology as rapidly as
61
was desired.
England had seemed to give her approval originally to
the establishment of a MLF when it was proposed at Nassau in
December, 1962. However, London apparently envisioned a force
based on a multinational concept organized around a closer com-
mitment of existing national forces rather than an entirely new
force (United States multilateral nuclear force).
62
 England
progressed from a somewhat confused acceptance of the MLF at
its outset to a complete rejection of it by early 1965. All
along the British felt despite their close ties with the United
States, the last line of their defense lay in their own re-
sources. "There may be conditions," Harold Macmillan, as Prime
Minister, told the House of Commors shortly after the Cuban
crisis, "There must be areas in which the interest of some
countries may seem to them more vital than they seem to
others . . . I would hope that Britain will be able, for as
long as possible, to maintain her position free from threat,
and should be able, should the necessity arise, to make her
independent decisions on issues vital to her life."
63
In the
desire to have their own independent deterrents, both England
and France agreed with the United States that the question of
national survival (questions of life and death of a country)
6 1Herve Alphand, "Address to the World Affairs Council,"
Ambassade de France (Monday, March 11, 1963), p. 5.
62For a more precise desciiption of this agreement see
the Joint Communique and Attached Statement on Nuclear Defense
Systems presented in Appendix A, page 58 of this report.
63
Harold Macmillan, "Debate in the House of Commons,"
Weekly Hansard, No. 517, (March 11-14, 1963), col. 932.
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was too serious to be delegated to any ally. Each refused to
give up control of its national arsenal to any other nation
or grouping of nations.
Given this sovereign nature of the members of NATO, ef-
fective decision making and control would have required an ex-
traordinary degree of harmony and trust, and this goes to the
root of NATO's basic problem, a lack of cohesion. It seemed
true that in economic affairs NATO officials had engaged in
important forms of cooperation, cutting across exclusive au-
thority of national governments. Sovereign states of NATO had
gone far indeed in relinquishing some independence in return
for economic, political, and military policies in special
fields of common interest: but they were far from surrendering
control of vital defense and foreign policies to any contral
authority, such as the MLF. In these crucial fields the nation-
state was still the ultimate political unit, for which there
was no substitute. This was the NATO-MLF dilemma, for the
problem of sovereignty became most acute over the issue of
nuclear control.
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The United States, the sponsoring nation of the multilat-
eral nuclear force proposal, was the obvious leader in the nu-
clear field within NATO. As the leader, America's function was
to set an example for its followers. In order to get Europeans
to surrender a lot of their sovereignty (and this would have
been necessary ui the MLF was to come into existence) the
64,
-C. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hear-ings on the  North Atlantic Treaty Oroanization, 98th Congress,2nd Session, 1966, p. 90.
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United States would have had to surrender a little of its own.
Of course de facto (in point of fact; actual or actually) some
sovereignty would have been given up in the form of mixed-
manning. However, in this case some de lure (from the law; by
right) surrender was required, if this project were to succeed.
Only by surrendering its veto power over the multilateral
nuclear force might the United States have been able to under-
mine the French force de frappe, thus stimulating the creation
of a European political authority, which would have included
Britain. American reluctance stemmed primarily from the fact
that decisions concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear control
were, by their very nature, concerned with the question of life
and death of the United States itself. Such reluctance by the
American authorities in the pcssible sharing of nuclea:. weapons
found its legal expression in the MacMahon Act (passed in 1946
and amended in 1954) which reserved nuclear questions primarily
for Americans, and therefore placed such questions outside of
the Atlantic Alliance. The sharing of nuclear responsibilities,
which might have been desired by a number of NATO allies,
foundered or the MacMahon Act. Legally then, the decision to
use nuclea - weapons could not be shared. This decision rep-
resented an expression of rational sovereignty at a time when
the survival of the country seemed at stake. Furthermore, the
ownership of nuclear weapons could not be shared. Countries
65




could not consent to finance armaments, the use of which would
not be under their control. The sponsors of the multilateral
nuclear force found it impossible to resolve such conflicts
of national interest.
This may be one of the reasons why European commentators
frequently pointed out that the American proposal for a multi-
lateral nuclear force within NATO, however useful it might have
been symbolically, to increase European sense of participa-
tion in nuclear defense, was not a plan for nuclear sharing
but rather a means of consolidating American control.
67
It
was possible that European governments may have been in a
better position to influence and understand American nuclear
strategy due to their participation in the MLF, but the power
to decide when and where to use nuclear weapons would remain
in the hands of the President of the United States.
68
If Washington held the ultimate veto through any form
of negative control, such as custody of warheads or delivery
vehicles, this would have largely counteracted the political
rational of an "integrated" multilateral nuclear force. But
if the United States retained no specific control, two types
of risks would accrue. There was the possibility of a paraly-
sis in multilateral European decision making which would viti-
ate the credibility of such a force in a time of crisis. On
66General Andre Beaufre, NATO and Europe (New York:
Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 86-87.
67Beaufre, "Dissuasion et Strategie," p. 56.
68
The New York Times, December 10, 1962, p. 8.
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the other hand, there was the risk that the force would be
used in circumstances contrary to American interests. America
felt that the risks
timately to give up
the veto power then
This is essentially
mentioned were too high and refused ul-
the veto. If the MLF had been established,
would have remained in American hands.
true because of the size of the MLF as
compared with the total American nuclear forces. The United
States alone would have been capable of making an independent
nuclear decision.
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Washington retained the power necessary
to block the use of the MLF while the Europeans could neither
block the use of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) if and when
the United States desired to use it, nor could the Europeans
force the use of the American nuclear arsenal if Washington
did not want it to be engaged. Opponents of the multilateral
concept regarded such a force as a mere super-addition to
the United States strategic forces, except that this MLF
would be paid for in part by European states with funds that
could be better expended in other more essential military
areas.70 The multilateral nuclear force therefore would not
have involved sharing in a genuine sense because it would
not have altered materially the locus of nuclear power. It
proposed nuclear sharing in a symbolic and psychological
69
Robert E. Osgood, The Case For the MLF: A CriticalEvaluation (Washingten: Center of Foreign Policy Research,1964), pp. 19-20.
70
Amme, Jr., NATO Without France, p. 164.
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sense, this was not true sharing of nuclear control.
Perhaps this issue of nuclear control of a collective
force proved to be the most intractable obstacle to its
establishment. The central problem was to combine deterrent
effectiveness with political feasibility, reconciling the
views of those wishing to veto such use. This is the problem
of "fifteen fingers" on the safety catch and on the trigger.
American proponents of the MLF skirted this delicate question
of ultimate control and instead stressed the technical excel-
lence of the hardware to be purchased at considerable cost
to Europeans.
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The United States apparently held the view
that since the multilateral force did not as vet exist, the
issue of nuclear control need not be faced until a later date.
The very size of the proposed multilateral nuclear force
was hardly larger than that of the independent national forces
which the American Administration had criticized as being
incapable of effective deterrent value. To use this frac-
tional force (the MLF, representing only approximately two
per cent of the total American force) would be to go to war
with only the smallest part of an available force. On the
other hand, if the United States agreed to go to war with
her entire nuclear arsenal, what would be the point in creat-
ing a NATO nuclear force? But, one must ask himself; 'does
the smallness of such a nuclear force (small in relation to
the total American nuclear arsenal) void completely the deter-
rence value of it?' According to a view held by many woll
7 -Robert Strausz-Hupe, 'The Crisis of Political Leader-ship," in NATO In Quest of Cohesion, ed. by Karl H. Cernyand Henry Briefs (New York: Frederick A. Prager, 1965), p.145.
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known military strategists (especially European) the size of
a force does not necessarily void the deterrent value of the
force. According to Francois de Rose:
But the fact that a force is small does not meanthat it necessarily_is ineffective. . . Its pur-pose La small force/ should be to serve noticethat no war can be started in Europe without run-ning the risk of bringing into play either theforces of America or the European forces which,though limited, would none the less be capable ofinflicting unacceptable destruction.72
Mr. de Rose concluded further that if European nuclear
forces (whether national or multilateral) can be deployed in-
dependently, "and if they are so effective as to be capable
of inflicting damage that would seriously handicap the Soviet
Union in its overall competition with the United States, the
additional risk they represent does cover our (Europe) pro-
blem."
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He contends that by purely military standardL the
independent non-American forces thus deployed in Europe might
appear puny and weak, but if they potentially delay or frus-
trate the success of Russian goals, they are not negligible.
They indeed, add to the deterrent posture of Europe and the
entire North Atlantic Alliance.
An additional discordant feature of the MLF proposal was
the confusion surrounding the structural organization to be
utilized if and when the program was to be activated. This
plan was an extremely ambiguous one. The relationship between
72






ends and means was not at all clear. For instance, in the
early speeches by United States officials concerning the MLF,
terms such as "multilateral," "integrated," or "unified" were
.ot clarified, and nothing was said about how such a force
74was to be controlled, deployed, or targeted. Structural
confusion permeated the multilateral plan from its conception
to its death in 1965. As early as 1962, with the Nassau Agree-
ment, the United States and Great Britain drew sharply diver-
gent conclusions from the same document. The 3ritish impres-
sion was that the Americans were in agreement with them that
the future structure of a NATO force would be organized around
closer commitment of existing national forces rather than a
new force. But, American officials had a different view of
a NATO nuclear force. It was to be an entirely new proposal
in which non-nuclear allies would win their right to partici-
pate by their financial contributions. Britain's agreement
on the MLF was not settled at Nassau and London became in-
cleasingly hostile as a multilateral instead of a multina-
tional concept was advanced.75 In fact, in late 1964, the
Wilson Government tried to undermine the MLF program, which
they felt they could not accept. They proposed an Atlantic
Nuclear Force (ANF) as an alternative. The ANF would allow
for limited German participation on a non-national basis,
74-u. S. Department of State  Bulletin XLVII, (September 27,1962) No. 1217, pp. 604-605. "Building the Atlantic Partner-ship: Some Lessons From the Past," speech by McGorge Bundy.
75Buchan, "Tho Multilateral Force: An Historical Per-spective," p. 12.
-
49
however, the larger part of the force would be made up of
national contingents from England, America, and France. This
proposal was defended by the British Minister of Defense who
explained "the only realistic basis for NATO defense is to
accept that we cannot invest a greater portion of our GNP
than we are doing now. Therefore, we can secure better value
for our money . . . with the forces we now have.
76
Structural confusion of the MLF proposal was also gen-
erated by Washington's shifting approach to the type of ves-
sels to be utilized. At first the Allies were promised B-47
American bombers, together with British Vulcan (subsDnic air-
craft). Later the United States government charmed to Polaris
missile submarines manned by international crews. Finally,
upon further reflection it suggested that armed surfac7. ships,
which were less expensive to build and technically better
adapted to European capabilities, would be preferable.77
Such ambiguities created a fog of European suspicion in re-
ference to American actions and, as Francois de Rose pointed
out, "misunderstandings had reached the point where motives
were being questioned."
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Finally, the multilateral nuclear force faltered due to
a lack of trust among the potential participants. This force,
76Sir John Slessor, "Command and Control of Allied Nu-clear Forces: A British View," Adelphi Papers, No. 22 (Au-gust, 1965), p. 3.
771J. S. Public Papers of the President, "Press Confer-ence: John F. Kennedy," (March 6, 1963), p. 241.
78
Francois de Rose, "Atlantic Relationships and Nuclear
Problems," p. 489.
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as had been concluded, would be primarily under the control
of the United States. European countries, and especially
France, argued that aJthough they found no fault with Ameri-
can intentions to defend Europe, they were not convinced that
in all possible crisis situations Americans woull live up to
their stated commitments. Europe was not sure that a United
States President would risk his own population to nuclear
attack for essentially European interests.
79 As French Ambas-
sador Herve Alphand explained, the French and British decision
to acquire nuclear weapons did not imply a lack of confidence
in the United States per se. It is a fact of international
life that no state will invite its own destruction in order
to defend others. Therefore, the silaller countries feel that
it will be best to have an independent means of deterri.nq
moves against their vital interests. The growth of independ-
ent nuclear forces could not be checked by the establishment
of a mixed-manned force such as the MLF.
80
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Mulley, "Nuclear Weapons: Challenge to National
Sovereignty," p. 38.
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CHAPTER V
SUY2,1ARY AND CONCLUSION
A military coalition may increase its military power
quantitatively, by expanding the numerical strength of its
existing military force level, or qualitatively, by replac-
ing or modifying its existing forms of military force (nor-
mally weapons systems) with new and more effective forms of
force. Expansion and innovation are thus possible charac-
teristics of any military coalition.
The MLF was originally presented to the members of NATO
as a qualitative measure which would increase cohesion and
harmony in the Alliance through individual participation in
a mix-manned nuclear force. It (MLF) germinated out of a
series of inquiries concerned with the changing relation-
ships of the NATO Alliance vis-a-vis both the United States
and the Soviet Union. In the light of such changing re-
lationships new questions were put forth. Why should the
United States continue to exercise a nuclear monopoly?
From this main question arose still others, such as the weak-
ness in American leadership, the credibility of United States'
protection of Europe in the event of crisis, and the charges
of a new colonialism in the making, in which Europe would
51
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become a permanent ward of America.
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Due to such questions, the United States felt it neces-
sary in 1960 to demonstrate to its NATO allies that it was
willing to share in the control of the nuclear deterrent.
This decision was presented in a NATO communique of December,
1960, in which Washington proposed a multilateral nuclear
force as a qualitative addition to the Atlantic Alliance's
military power structure.82 This suggestion raised as many
questions as it proposed to solve. This new mixed-manned
nuclear force would have to conform with a Congressional re-
quirement (the MacMahon Act) that the final decision for the
use of American made nuclear weapons would have to rest with
the President of the United States; it had to anticipate the
negative effect such a plan would have upon any present or
future disarmament and nonproliferation talks; in short, it
would have to create the illusion of equality and sharing
while actually maintaining the primacy of American control.
The MLF proposal failed in the midst of European suspicions
and concentrated French opposition.
A lesson that may be drawn from the futile effort to
establish a multilateral nuclear force is that there was no
apparent solution to the problem of nuclear control that was
satisfactory to all the major members of NATO. The United
States was unable to give its allies a genuine share in the
81
Lawrence W. Kaplan, Recent American Foreign Policy:
Conflicting Interpretations (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey
Press, 1968), pp. 282-83.
82i bid.
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control of nuclear weapons, although that seemed to be the
only proposal which would have fully met European desires
to share in the decisions concerning nuclear deterrence.
America was unable to do this because the political pre-
requisites were lacking; joint management of major nuclear
forces within the Alliance assumed an Atlantic political
community that did not exist.
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The Atlantic Alliance re-
mained a grouping of independent sovereign nation-states.
The failure of the multilateral nuclear force was a prime
example of an inherent weakness of such an alliance. Appar-
ently there are limitations upon the cohesiveness that can
be expected from an international organization. The sharing
of nuclear responsibility as proposed by the MLF, would have
infringed upon the sovereignty of the member nations, ..-nd
this was unacceptable to most members of NATO. The diffi-
culty with the plan to create an MLF then was that it pre-
supposed a common political authority
which had not been achieved.
It seems no longer possible
over the Alliance
to speak of integrated or
supra-national policies to Europe while practicing national
decision making in the United States. Washington found it
increasingly difficult to urge European
insisting on complete freedom of action
in European attitudes toward the United
cooperation, while
itself. The change
States has been in-
troduced by the resurgenc,,i! of Europe economically and
83Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals,
p. 63.
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politically and by the demise of an immediate czmmunist
84
threat.
A stronger Europe, free from fear of econorc collapse
and Soviet invasion, has turned its resentment toward Ameri-
can nuclear monopoly and over-dependence on the United
States. Many European countries, especially France, have
been very outspoken in describing their desires for a United
Europe as a formidable power, capable of defending itself
from an aggressor, beholden to no other nation. This spirit
of European nationalism came in the wake of prosperity and
self-confidence. Whether a United Europe could come into
being is debatable because each country remains reluctant
to submerge the national sovereignty which has :7z,ant so much
to them.
America has been alarmed by the new European national-
ist tendencies. Washington seems to have forgotten that the
initial purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Orcanization
was to aid the war-torn Europeans to reach a point where
they would be capable of defending themselves from aggres-
sion. Europe's emerging ability to do so seems a mark of
NATO's success, not a stigma of its failure. ThrE reconstruc-
tion of Europe has in fact proceeded at such a fantastic rate
that the Allies are presently becoming formidab17, rivals econ-
omically, and full-fledged partners militarily.
84Robert Kleiman, Atlantic Crisis: American Diplomacy 
Confronts a Resurgent Europe (New York: W. W. 1;:rton and Co.,
1.9(7)4), p. 154.
85Steel, The End of Alliance, pp. 66-72.
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In conclusion, the MLF proposal, presented as an instru-
ment of cohesion, in reality, amplified the lack of cohesion
that has been growing within NATO throughout the past decade.
This lack of cohesion may not be viewed as a sign of total
failure, but rather one of success. The most successful
form of military alliance is one which prevents open hostil-
ities. The lack of alliance cohesion within NATO stems frcm
a decrease in international tensions and fears which NATO
helped to allay. Perhaps one must assume that the time has
come for America to re-evaluate its role in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and to consider whether this alliance
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mceungs that I hie had the prisi:ege of having
b,th w:th ‘ou, sir, and iour predececsory, marl a
ino‘t imp...mai-it. indeed vital part in the close associ-
ation between our .:,tintries, who base been through
so much together in the past, and who have such
high hopes together for the future.
Since I became Prime Minister of the United King-
dom I ha..c had the good foitunc to /lase many
meetings. both with you, sir, and sour predecessor.
Indeed, this is the t 6th such meeting that I have had.
and as I 1.”. I believe they are of the greatest value.
But they are all the more agreeable when we are
allowed to base the, . n surroundings such as we
see here today, and we are ser grateful to the
Gosernor. to the administration, and to 21 the people
ot the island for their kindness, for their reception
of us. tor the good will that I am sure you feel,
Mr. President, they have toward you and the cJun-
uy of which ou are proud to be the head. I trust
that the work that we shall do will be, moire so
because it be held M such delightful surround-
ings, effectlie and fruitful. I wekome you, sir.
554 Joint Statement Following Discussions With Prime Minister
Macmillan--The Nassau Agreement. December 21, 1962
THE PRESIDENT and the Prime Minister
met in Nassau from December ISth to De-
cember 21St. They were accompanied by
the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McNamara,
and the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Ball.
and by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home.
the Minister of Defense. Mr. Thorneycroft
and the Secretary of State for Common-
vvealth Relations and Colonies, Mr. Sandys.
The President and the Prime Minister
discussed a wide range of topics. "Fhey re-
viewed the state of East-Wcst relations in the
aftermath of the October crisis in Cuba, and
joined in the hope that a satisfactory resolu-
tion of this crisis might open the way to the
settlement of other problems outstanding
between the West and the Soviet Union.
In particular, they reviewed the present
state of the negotiations for a treaty ending
nuclear tests, and reaffirmed their intent to
seek agreement on this issue with the
U.S.S.R.. in the hope that this agreement
would lead on to successful negotiations on
wider issues of disarmament.
As regards Berlin, they reaffirmed their
interest in arriving at a solid and enduring
settlement which would insure that Berlin
remains free and viable.
The Chinese Communist attack on India
was discussed with special consideration
being gisen to the way in which the two
governments might assist the Gosernment
of India to counter this aggressirn. Defense
problems of the subcontinent were reviewed.
The Prime Minister and the President are
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hopeful that the common interests of Pakis-
tan and India in the security of the subcon-
tinent would lead to a reconciliation of
Indian-Pakistan differences. To this end,
they expressed their gratification at the states-
manship shown by President Ayub and
Prime Minister Nehru in agreeing to renew
their efforts to resolve their differences at
this crucial moment.
The two leaders discussed the current
state of affairs in the Congo, and agreed to
continue their efforts for an equitable inte-
gration of this troubled country. They ex-
pressed support for Mr. Spaak's proposal for
a fair disision of revenues and noted with
concern the dangers of further discord in
the Congo.
The Prime .Minister informed the Presi-
dent of the present state of negotiations for
U.K. membership in the Common Market.
The President reaffirmed the interest of the
United States in an early and successful
outcome.
The President and the Prime Minister also
discussed in considerable detail policy on
advanced nuclear weapons systems and con-
sidered a variety of approaches. The result
of this discussion is set out in the attached
statement.
STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
t. The President and the Prime Minister
reviewed the development program for the
Skvbolt missile. The President explained
that it was no longer expected that this very
88U. S. Public Papers of the President, "Joint StatementFollowing Discue.sloils With Prime Minister Macmillan - The
7:assali Acireerno.-,t.„"
litZT •••
John F. Kennedy, 1962 Dcc. [5541
comp!cx weapon system would be corn-
pleted ss ithin the cost estimate or the time
scale %%bids %%tie projected when the pro-
gram was begun.
a. The President informed the Prime
Minister that for this reason and because of
the asailability to the United Sutes of alter-
natise weapons systems. he had decided to
cancel plans for the production of Skybolt
for use by the United States. Nevertheless,
recognizing the importance of the Skybolt
program for the United Kingdom, and re-
calling that the purpose of the offer of Sky-
bolt to the United Kingdom in 1960 had
been to assist in improsing and extending
the elective life of the British V-bombers,
the President expressed his readiness to con-
tinue the desclopment of the missile as 1
joint enterprise between the United States
and the United Kingdom, with each coun-
tty bearing equal shares of the future cost
of completing deselopment, after which the
United Kingdom would be able to place a
production order to meet its requirements.
3. While recognizing the value of this
offer. the Prime Minister decided, after full
consideration, not to avail himself of it be-
cause of doubts that had been expressed
about the pro4pects of success for this weap-
ons sy stem and because of uncertainty regard-
ing date of completion and finai cost of the
program.
4. As a possible alternative the President
suggested that the Royal Air Force might
use the Hound Dog missile. The Prime
Minister responded that in the light of the
technical difficulties he was unable to accept
this sungestion.
5. The Prime Minister then turned to the
possibility of prosision of the Polaris missile
to the United Kingdom by the United
States. After careful review. the President
and the Prime :Minister agreed that a deci-
sion on Polaris must be considered in the
widest context both of the future defense of
the Atlantic Alliance and of the safety of
the whoie Free World. They reached the
conclusion that this issue created an oppor-
tunity for the development of new and closer
arrangements for the organization and con-
trol of strategic Western defense and that
such arrangements in turn could make a
major contribcnion to political cohe;ion
among the nations of the Alliance.
6. The Prime Minister suggested and the
President agreed. that for the immediate
future 1 start could be made by subscribing
to NATO some part of the forces already in
existence. This could include allocations
from United States Strategic Forces, from
United Kingdom Bomber Command, and
from tactical nuclear forces now held in
Europe. Such forces would be assigned as
pan of a NATO nuclear force and targeted
in accordance with NATO ptins.
7. Returning to Polaris the President and
the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose
of their two governments with respect to the
provision of the Polaris missiles must be the
development of multilateral NATO nu-
clear force in the closest consultation with
other NATO allies. They will use their
best endeavors to this end.
8. Accordingly, the President and the
Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. will
make available on a continuing basis Polaris
missiles (less warheads) for British sub-
marines. The U.S. will also study the feasi-
bility of making available certain support
facilities for such submarines. The U.K.
Gosernment will construct the submarines in
which these weapons will be placed and they
wili also provide the nuclear warheads for
the Polaris missiles. British forces developed
under this plan will be assigned and targeted
in the same way as the forces described its
paragraph 6.
These forces, and at least equal U.S. forces,
would be made available for inclusion in a
NATO multilateral nuclear force. The
Prime Minister made it clear that except
where H.M.G. may decide that supreme
national interests are at stake, these British
forces will be used fur the purposes of inter-
national defense of the Western Alliance in
all circumstances.
9. The President and the Prime Minister
are convinced that this new plan will
909
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strengthen the nuclear defence of the West-
ern Alliance. In strategic terms this defense
is indivisible, and it is their conviction that
in all ordinary circumstances of crisis or
danger, it is this very unity which is the best
protection of the West.
JO. The President and the Prime Minister
agreed that in addition to having a nuclear
shield it is important to have a non-nuclear
sword. For this purpose they agreed on the
importance of increasing the effectiveness of
their conventional forces on a worldwide
basis.
555 Proclamation 3511: Emancipation Proclamation Centennial.
December 28, 1962
By the President of the United States of
America a Proclamation:
WHEREAS January I, 1961, marks the cen-
tennial of the Proclamation in which Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln declared all persons
held as slaves in States or parts of States still
in rebellion to be "then, thenceforward, and
forever free"; and
WHEREAS the issuance of the Emancipation
Proclamation marked the beginning of the
end of the iniquitous institution of slavery in
the United States, and a great stride toward
the fulfillment of the principle of the Decla-
ration of Independence that "al! men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights. that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness"; and
WHEarAs the Emancipation Proclamation
and the 13th, Nth and t5th amendments to
the Constitution of the United States guar-
anteed to Negro citizens equal rights with all
other citizens of the United States and have
made possible _..-reat progress toward the
enjoyment of those rights; and
WHEREAS the goal of equal rights for all
our citizens is still unreached. and the secur-
ing of these rights is one of the great un-
finished tasks of our democracy:
Now, TH ER E Et. R E, 1, JoHN F. KENNEDY,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim that the Emancipation
Proclamation expresses our Nation's policy,
founded on justice and morality, and that it
is therefore fitting and proper to commemo-
rate the centennial of the historic Emancipa-
tion Proclamation throughout the ear 1963.
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I call upon the Governors of the States,
mayors of cities, and other public officials, as
Wen 25 private persons, organizations, and
groups, to observe the centennial by appro.
priate ceremonies.
I seat:est the United States Commission
on Civil Rights to plan and participate in
appropriate commemorative activities recog-
nizing the centennial of the issuance of the
Emancipation Proclamatinn; and I also re-
quest the Commission on Civil Rights and
other Federal agencies to cooperate fully with
State and local governments during 1963.:
commemorating these events.
I call upon all citizens of the United States
and all officials of the United States and of
every State and local government to dedicate
themselves to the completion of the task of
assuring that every American, regardless of
his rare, religion, color, or national origin,
eniovs all the rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States.
IN Worm.ss \\ THEREOF, I have hereunto set
my hand and caused the Seal of
[SEAL] the United States of America to be
affixed this aSth day of December
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
and sixty-two and of the Independence of
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